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“(…) the problem with contemporary evolutionary 
theory is not that its essential neo-Darwinian paradigm 
is incorrect. The problem is that the consistency argu-
ment of the synthesis (…) is itself troubled. That argu-
ment says that the core neo-Darwinian paradigm (the 
theory that deals with the origin, maintenance, and 
modification of within-population genetic structure) is 
consistent with all other known evolutionary phenom-
ena. This credo, innocuous and undeniable as it is, has 
been expanded to mean that the neo-Darwinian para-
digm of selection plus drift, are both necessary and 
sufficient to explain all other known evolutionary phe-
nomena. My position here, and the position of all other 
doubters of the completeness of the synthesis that I 
know of, is simply that the neo-Darwinian paradigm 
is indeed necessary—but is not sufficient—to handle 
the totality of known evolutionary phenomena. And it 
may not even be necessary to explain certain particular 
phenomena. It is thus not a matter of either/or”
Niles Eldredge (1985, p. 119)
Unfinished Ontologies of the Modern Synthesis: 
The Hierarchical Structure of Nature 
and the Neglected Processes in Evolutionary 
Thought
Written almost 35 years ago, the words of Niles Eldredge 
that we chose as our epigraph still resonate in the contem-
porary landscape of evolutionary biology (see Laland et al. 
2014; Love 2017). As has been claimed many times (e.g. 
in Wagner 2014), the ontology and language of popula-
tion genetics, the explanatory heart of the Modern Syn-
thesis (MS), are far too limited and abbreviated to capture 
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the richness of life. The consistency argument represented 
a pivotal desideratum in the early writings of the archi-
tects of the Modern Synthesis (Gould 1982; Beatty 1986; 
see also Mayr 1982), but it soon grew into an incomplete 
account of the ‘furniture’ of the biological world (Eldredge 
1985). To use the words of the historian of biology William 
Ball Provine, the MS entailed both a “synthesis” (chiefly 
of Mendelian genetics, natural selection and “population 
thinking”1) and a “constriction” (Provine 2001). According 
to some traditional historiographies (see Futuyma 2015), 
such constriction or exclusion can be understood (and even 
excused) by putting into the limelight the state of evolution-
ary discourse in the early twentieth century (see Simpson 
1944; Bowler 1983; Reif et al. 2000): the theory of natural 
selection was the subject of many negative assessments and 
major disparagement in Europe, the United States and other 
parts of the world in the so-called “eclipse of Darwinism”. 
The architects of the Modern Synthesis had to stand out and 
fiercely shield the causal primacy of natural selection acting 
in particular populational contexts, in an attempt to explain 
phenotypic change, reproductive isolation, the gargantuan 
problem of the ‘origin of species’ and, by extrapolation, the 
macroevolutionary patterns of biodiversity. For Eldredge 
(1985), the purview of the MS limited its attention to only a 
few (ontologically real) biological entities involved causally 
in the evolutionary process: genes, organisms, demes and 
species (monophyletic taxa of higher taxonomic rank, for 
instance, were dimly appreciated); whereas ecological enti-
ties (e.g. populations as actors in the conversion and transfer 
of matter and energy, communities and regional biotas) were 
overlooked altogether. Eldredge yielded an ontological argu-
ment to challenge the explanatory sufficiency of the Modern 
Synthesis: “in order to use the neo-Darwinian paradigm to 
explain everything, we must stress the existence of some 
biological entities while ignoring (even denying) the exist-
ence of others” (Eldredge 1985, p. 119). In the eyes of that 
famous American paleontologist, what evolutionary biology 
needed in 1985 was a revised ontology (see also Hull 1980) 
of evolutionary entities and a subsequent restructuring of 
evolutionary theory. As Eldredge contended, an extended 
ontology could present an alternative but more truthful 
description of the organization of nature: a hierarchical 
structure. “Genes, organisms, demes, species, and monophy-
letic taxa form one nested hierarchical system of individuals 
that is concerned with the development, retention, and modi-
fication of information ensconced, at base, in the genome. 
But there is at the same time a parallel hierarchy of nested 
ecological individuals —proteins, organisms, populations, 
communities, and regional biotal systems, that reflects the 
economic organization and integration of living systems. 
The processes within each of these two process hierarchies, 
plus the interactions between the two hierarchies, seems to 
me to produce the events and patterns that we call evolution” 
(Eldredge 1985, p. 7). Thus, the Hierarchy Theory of Evolu-
tion (HTE) was born,2 as a formal embodiment of the claim 
that evolution is probably a more complex affair than the 
MS would have us believe (as explicitly stated in Eldredge 
1985), adding an extended ontology of evolutionary enti-
ties to the field of evolutionary biology (for a history of the 
so-called “paleobiological revolution” in which the HTE 
sprouted, see Sepkoski 2012; recently, the HTE has been 
updated with the framework of network theory, see Tëmkin 
and Eldredge 2015; Tëmkin and Serrelli 2016).
Since the advent of the MS, the field of evolutionary 
biology has continued to incorporate new theoretical and 
empirical findings (e.g. neutral theory of molecular evolu-
tion; inclusive fitness theory), covering a broader range of 
phenomena with refined explanations (Laland et al. 2015). 
However, new contentious developments have been forcibly 
accommodated and interpreted with undisputable agreement 
to the core assumptions of the original MS (Laland et al. 
2015; see also Pigliucci and Müller 2010a). Historically, 
from the onset of the second half of the twentieth-century up 
to present times, several challenges to the MS have surfaced 
from multiple paleontological and neontological trenches, 
calling either to expand the standard theory (e.g. by rec-
ognizing the action of selection at different levels), extend 
it (by integrating unrecognized meaningful processes and 
fields of inquiry), or replace it altogether with a whole differ-
ent framework (Depew and Weber 2013). For the proponents 
of the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (EES), the narrow 
and “gene-centric” stance of the MS [or, more precisely, of 
what has come to be the updated “Standard Evolutionary 
Theory” (SET) in the twenty-first century] fails to capture 
the “full gamut of processes that direct evolution. Miss-
ing pieces include how physical development influences 
the generation of variation (developmental bias); how the 
environment directly shapes organisms’ traits (plasticity); 
how organisms modify environments (niche construction); 
and how organisms transmit more than genes across gen-
erations (extragenetic inheritance)” (Laland et al. 2014, 
p. 162). According to its detractors, the standard interpre-
tation of these phenomena underestimate its evolutionary 
implications: too much causal significance is granted to 
1 We should stress that this historiographic account is not exempt of 
criticism. Two critical appraisals, among many others, are found in 
Amundson (2005) and Delisle (2011).
2 However, in his recent book Eternal Ephemera: Adaptation and the 
Origin of Species from the Nineteenth Century Through Punctuated 
Equilibria and Beyond, Niles Eldredge (2015) claimed that the HTE 
is much older: it goes back to the early decades of the nineteenth cen-
tury, with the pioneering contributions of Jean-Baptiste Lamarck and 
Giambattista Brocchi, among others (see also Eldredge 2016).
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genes and selection, while constructive developmental pro-
cesses that create novel variants, bias selection, contribute 
to heredity, and generate adaptive fit are belittled (Laland 
et al. 2015). Some of these processes, it has been claimed, 
were neglected until recently by the mainstream strand of 
evolutionary thought (see the case of ‘niche construction’ 
in Odling-Smee et al. 2003). The EES construes those pro-
cesses as rightful evolutionary causes, whereas the orthodox 
evolutionists regard them as mere outcomes of evolution. 
From that standpoint, the EES sees an incomplete ontol-
ogy of evolutionary processes in the SET. The EES, as a 
conceptual framework that emphasizes organismal causes 
of development, inheritance and differential fitness, the role 
of constructive processes in development and evolution, and 
reciprocal representations of causation, delivers an extended 
ontology of evolutionary processes, including those that gen-
erate novel variants, bias selection, modify the frequency of 
heritable variation and contribute to inclusive transgenera-
tional inheritance (see Laland et al. 2015).
Contrasting the two cases (i.e. the Hierarchy Theory of 
Evolution and the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis) of 
assertions about the unfinished ontologies of the Modern 
Synthesis (and the updated SET) brings to mind a particu-
lar insight. At first blush, it seems that the correspondent 
extended ontologies of the HTE and the EES are, to a cer-
tain extent, complementary: the HTE provides an extended 
ontology of evolutionary entities and the EES proposes an 
extended ontology of evolutionary processes. Will a system-
atic analysis of the premises, core assumptions and concep-
tual architectures of both the HTE and the EES support or 
impugn this gross intuition?
Extended Ontologies in the Contemporary Landscape 
of Evolutionary Biology: A Road Towards Unification?
A few years ago, Eldredge (2008, p. 10) stated that “(e)
volutionary biology is a notoriously diffuse field of scien-
tific inquiry”. The discipline seems to comprise a plural 
landscape (surely, some biologists would prefer to call it 
a ‘befogged panorama’) of multiple co-existent conceptual 
frameworks and strenuous voices that disagree on the nature 
and scope of evolutionary theory (e.g. Oyama 2000; Kirsch-
ner and Gerhart 2005; Dieckmann and Doebeli 2005; Lynch 
2007; Laubichler 2010; Wagner 2011; Winther et al. 2013; 
Nei 2013; Jablonka and Lamb 2014; Laland et al. 2014, 
2015; Futuyma 2015; Pavličev and Wagner 2015; Pievani 
2016a; Eldredge et al. 2016; Welch 2017). Thus, a crucial 
question arises: what exactly is evolutionary biology in the 
twenty-first century? It has even been contested that evolu-
tionary biology should be portrayed as a single enterprise 
at all (see Serrelli and Gontier 2015 for thought-provoking 
questions). In this context, we wonder if epistemological 
pluralism should be embraced for evolutionary biology. Is 
the unification of this scientific field attainable? Is it some-
thing desirable (heuristically or epistemologically) and 
worth-pursing in the future? If so, what kind of framework 
could take up the colossal task?
In recent years, the Hierarchy Theory of Evolution has 
been depicted as a promising candidate to achieve that goal: 
Eldredge (2008) claimed that the meta-pattern of relation-
ships between the ecological and the genealogical hierar-
chies is a putative framework for the theoretical ‘‘unifica-
tion’’ of evolutionary biology. Pievani and Serrelli (2013) 
argued that the HTE allows re-thinking and re-framing 
protracted concepts of evolutionary theory (e.g. natural 
selection; species; speciation), and that the hierarchical 
interplay between ecology and genealogy (i.e. an interrela-
tion in a “Sloshing Bucket” fashion; for an outline of this 
model, see Eldredge 2003) is and will continue to be a fun-
damental ingredient for the most compelling explanations 
in evolutionary biology; for philosopher of biology Telmo 
Pievani (2016a), an important theoretician of the HTE, this 
framework is a good example of a “meta-theory” that could 
integrate the sum of the observed evolutionary patterns (of 
small-, medium- and large-scale evolution) into a global and 
coherent structure. On the other hand, the Extended Evolu-
tionary Synthesis is gaining ground in evolutionary biology: 
in 2016, a major grant was awarded to an interdisciplinary 
team of over 50 international scholars, with Kevin Laland 
(University of St Andrews, Scotland) and Tobias Uller (Lund 
University, Sweden) as the project leaders, for a three-year 
research program to “put the predictions of the extended 
evolutionary synthesis to the test” (see http://synergy.st-
andrews.ac.uk/ees/the-project/). Moreover, researchers from 
different fields are embracing the EES as a working frame-
work to deliver integrative explanations (see the cases of 
physiology in Noble et al. 2014; psychology and human cog-
nition in Stotz 2014; sociocultural evolution in Blute 2015; 
biochemistry in Vianello and Passamonti 2016; biological 
anthropology in Fuentes 2016 and Vergara-Silva 2016; lan-
guage evolution in Suman 2016; and plant domestication in 
Piperno 2017).
It is clear that the HTE and the EES are two important 
frameworks in the contemporary landscape of evolution-
ary biology. Are their extended ontologies complemen-
tary, or could they be easily linked together? Could they 
merge into a unique framework? In that regard, Pievani 
(2016b) asserted the following: “Evolutionary biology 
itself is an evolving scientific discipline, demanding for 
pluralistic explanatory models. Key concepts, advanced 
by the extended synthesis supporters, such as reciprocal 
causation (Laland et al. 2015), or catching the constructive 
relationship between the ecological environment and organ-
isms’ behavior and development, could perfectly match with 
the multilevel framework proposed by hierarchy theory” 
(p. 363; emphasis added by us). We can then ask: Is that 
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potential match so “perfect”? The objective of the rest of 
this paper is to outline some of the epistemic bridges and 
conceptual rifts that exist between the HTE and the EES, 
in the interest of future debates and thorough appraisals, 
both scientific and philosophical, about the ‘unification’ or 
pluralism in evolutionary biology.
Epistemic Bridges Between the HTE and the EES: 
Reciprocal/Multilevel Views of Causation, 
the ‘Reinvented Organism’ and Niche 
Construction
Reciprocal/Multilevel Views of Causation
In the last decades, several arguments called into question 
the adequacy of traditional causation schemes in evolu-
tionary biology (reviewed in Martínez and Esposito 2014); 
some of those arguments focused on the necessity to reas-
sess the famous dichotomy of proximate/ultimate causes, 
and others urged to complement the ‘bottom-up’ causal 
model with a ‘top-down’ approach. Specifically, some 
proponents of the EES dissent with Ernst Mayr’s clear-cut 
distinction of proximate and ultimate causes (see Mayr 
1961). For them, Mayr’s heuristic dichotomy has proven 
problematic because it builds on a deterministic (gene-cen-
tric) view of development that led to the widespread belief 
that ontogenetic processes are irrelevant to evolutionary 
questions (therefore, unsuccessful to explain the origin of 
characters and evolutionary novelties) (Laland et al. 2011, 
2013). Mayr’s dichotomy disregards the fact that proximate 
mechanisms contribute to the dynamics of selection (Laland 
et al. 2011, 2013). Laland and collaborators (2011, p. 1516) 
make an interesting claim for historians and philosophers 
of biology to ponder: “It would seem that the manner in 
which biologists think about causality has acted like a meta-
theoretical conceptual framework to stabilize the dominant 
scientific paradigm”. According to this view, Mayr’s uni-
directional characterization of causation paves the way for 
simplistic cause-effect explanations rather than focusing 
on broader trends, feedback cycles, or distributed causal 
influences throughout biological systems; this dichotomy 
forged artificial divisions within evolutionary biology and 
between the field and adjacent disciplines, and obstructed 
several contemporary debates in biology (Laland et al. 
2011, 2013). In its place, these authors and other colleges 
advocate for a reciprocal view of causation, where devel-
opmental processes, operating through developmental bias 
and niche construction, co-construct with natural selection 
the organism-environment complementarity, and affect the 
direction and rate of evolution (Laland et al. 2015 for a 
critical assessment of reciprocal causation, see Svensson 
2017). Additionally, several critiques to the reductionist 
assumptions preeminent in evolutionary biology have 
pinpointed the incompleteness of the bottom-up approach 
to biological causality (i.e. departing from molecules to 
ecosystems) (Martínez and Esposito 2014). For instance, 
Gilbert and Sarkar (2000) have defended an organicist 
stance where bottom-up and top-down approaches must be 
deployed conjointly to realistically attempt to explain the 
complex ontology of biological phenomena. Top-down (or 
downward) causation refers to the idea that “in a hierarchi-
cally structured system, causal influence may on occasion 
run from whole to part, i.e. down to the hierarchy” (Okasha 
2011, p. 49).
These discussions on alternative schemes of biologi-
cal causality are relevant to philosophical assessments of 
the HTE. Eldredge (1985) pointed out that the interactive 
nature of the various levels in the inclusive hierarchies 
encompassed in the HTE (i.e. genealogical and ecologi-
cal) entails both upward and downward causation, which 
transcend the effects between the individuals of one level 
and their nearest (higher and lower) neighbors. Pievani 
(2016a) stressed that events produced at the highest level 
of the genealogical hierarchy can impinge downwards to 
lower levels, or conversely, causality can be propagated 
upwards. For the HTE, “in biological systems, a pair of 
adjacent levels comprises a dual control system, where 
the interactions of entities at a lower level establish initi-
ating conditions (upward causation) and the interactions 
of entities at a higher level exert constraints, or determine 
boundary conditions (downward causation)” (Tëmkin and 
Serrelli 2016, p. 22).
The views of causation espoused by the proponents of 
the EES and the HTE are both ‘reciprocal’ sensu lato. The 
EES acknowledges causal co-determination (reciprocity) 
in the pairing of “developing organism-environment” and 
also the causal flow “both upwards from lower levels of bio-
logical organization, such as DNA, and from higher levels 
downwards, such as through tissue- and environment-spe-
cific gene regulation” (Laland et al. 2015). The HTE grants 
the existence of topward and downward reciprocal flow of 
causation as well (see Pievani and Serrelli 2013; Pievani 
2016a). This is the first epistemic bridge we have detected 
between these frameworks: compatible views of causation. 
Both frameworks share the recognition of the reciprocal flow 
of causality (upwards and downwards), and, furthermore, 
what brings them closer is their rejection to the exclusively 
linear view of causation of the MS.
Multilevel causation, which is potentially a more inclu-
sive framework to rethink causality in evolutionary biology, 
was proposed by Martínez and Esposito (2014) on the basis 
of the pioneering work of Donald Campbell (1974; see also 
recent discussions in Bertolaso and Buzzoni 2017). This 
concept takes into account all the mechanisms of causal 
determination and co-determination (i.e. feedback loops 
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and reciprocal causation sensu stricto, as the latter has been 
defined in Laland et al. 2013), multiply directed (bottom-up 
and top-down), “(…) that occur between entities and events 
at different levels of organization, and that connect different 
time scales” (Martínez and Esposito 2014, p. 213). If both 
the EES and the HTE were to embrace a multilevel view of 
causation, the epistemic bridge linking them would become 
even stronger.
The ‘Reinvented’ Organism
In a recent essay entitled “Reinventing the Organism: 
Evolvability and Homology in Post-Dahlem Evolution-
ary Biology”, the evolutionary biologist Günter P. Wag-
ner (2015) put forth a different historiographical narra-
tive, compared to the one in Eldredge’s 1985 book (see 
Sect. 1), of what constituted the ontology of evolutionary 
biology from the inception of the MS to the early eighties. 
For Wagner, the ontology of real and valuable entities was 
restricted to genes (including its material basis, DNA, and 
its variants, alleles and haplotypes), populations (as statis-
tical aggregates of alleles and haplotypes) and species; the 
organism (an entity present in Eldredge’s reconstruction 
of the MS) was neglected as a fact of nature, relegated 
as a mere vehicle for the transmission of genes, or as an 
epiphenomenon with no significance whatsoever to evo-
lutionary thinking (see also Ingold 1990, 2004; Nichol-
son 2014). The consensual definition of ‘evolution’ as any 
change in allelic frequency over time was the epitome of 
the restricted outlook of that ontology. Wagner (2015) also 
argues that the intellectual milestone that expanded the 
ontology of evolutionary biology was the 1981 Dahlem 
Conference on Evolution and Development held in Berlin 
(an articulation of the vision built on the idea that devel-
opment needed to be integrated into evolutionary explana-
tions; e.g. Gould 1977; Riedl 1978; Alberch et al. 1979). 
Following this author, the conception of the organism was 
‘reinvented’ for evolutionary biology with the ensuing rec-
ognition of its variational properties (i.e. developmental 
constraints, variational modularity, facilitated variation 
and evolvability) and several structural aspects of organ-
ismal phenotypes (e.g. homologues/homology; modules/
modularity; novelties; canalization; gene regulatory net-
works), predominantly by incorporating concepts derived 
from evolutionary developmental biology (Evo-Devo sensu 
Müller 2007). Whether the organism was neglected or not 
from mainstream evolutionary biology by the leverage of 
the MS (Wagner’s and Eldredge’s accounts, respectively), 
a theme that by itself deserves more systematic treatments 
from historians of biology, it is undeniably present in the 
contemporary ontology of the field, and its importance 
for evolutionary explanations is enormous. An essential 
piece of information for the point we want to make in this 
subsection (hinting at another epistemic bridge between 
HTE and the EES) is that the variational properties of 
organisms (sensu Wagner) have been incorporated into the 
emerging conceptual framework of the EES (see Laland 
et al. 2015). The ‘reinvented organism’ should be consid-
ered as a crucial component of the backbone of the EES.
In contrast, from early on, the HTE regarded the organ-
ism as a crucial player in the evolutionary process, but for 
different reasons than the ones championed by the struc-
turalist tradition in evolutionism of which we believe G. P. 
Wagner is an heir. In Unfinished Synthesis, Niles Eldredge 
(1985, p. 143) identified organisms as the only shared 
instance between the ecological and genealogical hierar-
chies: “Note that organisms are included in both lists, a cir-
cumstance that is at once somewhat problematical and yet 
perhaps the crucial link between the two hierarchies”. Back 
then, this author argued that the significance of organisms 
in the evolutionary process relied on the expression of their 
genes and them being the locus of natural selection; moreo-
ver, for Eldredge, the organism is the nexus between the 
environment (matter-energy transfer and conversion) and 
information (reproduction). But, what is an organism for 
the contemporary version of the HTE? We think that this 
question has not been properly addressed by the proponents 
of the framework. A possible epistemic bridge between the 
EES and the HTE could be built if the ‘reinvented’ char-
acterization of the organism present in the former would 
also be used to redefine or reformulate the concept in the 
latter theoretical framework. The HTE seems open to inte-
grate insights from Evo-Devo (see Pievani 2016a), and the 
redefinition of the concept of ‘organism’ could be a good 
start. A good example of steps aimed in that direction is 
the recent work by Italian philosopher of science Silvia 
Caianiello (2016), which revisits the phenotypic hierarchy 
(also called “somatic hierarchy”) of the HTE by integrating 
insights from developmental gene regulatory networks and 
Evo-Devo, Eco-Evo-Devo, genotype-phenotype maps, and 
“homology thinking”, among other themes also discussed 
by the EES.
Niche Construction
Organisms are not just beacons of heritable information: 
they modify their environments through their metabolism, 
activities and choices with significant ecological and evo-
lutionary consequences. Niche Construction Theory (NCT) 
explicitly construes environmental modification by organ-
isms (“niche construction” sensu stricto), and its legacy 
across generations (dubbed “ecological inheritance”), to 
be important evolutionary processes (Odling-Smee et al. 
2003, 2013). Under this perspective, organisms exert influ-
ence over their own evolution by affecting natural selec-
tion regimes: niche construction modifies and stabilizes 
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environmental states in nonrandom ways, thereby impos-
ing systematic biases on the selective pressures acting on 
themselves and other species (Laland et al. 2015, 2016).
NCT is a major explanatory component of the EES (see 
Laland et al. 2015) and we are not the first to suggest that 
niche construction could be explored under hierarchical 
frameworks (see Pievani 2016a). Therefore, we see the 
potential common employment of niche construction as 
one of the strongest epistemic bridges between the HTE 
and the EES. For the HTE, the importance of the ecological 
hierarchy and of associated processes (especially of mac-
roecological dynamics) as drivers of evolution is immense 
(see Lieberman et al. 2007; Eldredge 2008; Miller 2008). 
Niche construction can have profound effects on ecology, 
e.g. by affecting the distribution and abundance of organ-
isms, changing the influence of keystone species, altering 
specific trophic relationships, and modulating the control 
of matter and energy transfer (Laland et al. 1999). Niche 
construction can also affect evolutionary rates, cause evolu-
tionary time lags, upset responses to selection, and generate 
cyclical dynamics (Laland et al. 2016). Wider implications 
of niche construction for macroecology become apparent by 
the establishment of “engineering webs” in both commu-
nities and ecosystems, modifying, for instance, ecosystem 
resilience (Laland et al. 1999). Furthermore, niche construc-
tion can have causal interspecific influences in an ecosystem, 
leading to direct or diffuse coevolution, hence substantially 
changing the stability and dynamics of ecosystems on both 
micro- and macroevolutionary timescales (Laland et al. 
2015). In summary, niche construction processes can out-
line several points of interaction between the genealogical 
and the ecological hierarchies not delineated previously by 
proponents of the HTE.
Pievani (2016b) states that niche construction is a good 
example of ‘water sloshing in the bucket’ (in reference to 
Eldredge’s 2003 model) of the twin hierarchies: “Selec-
tive pressures come from the ecological hierarchy, affect-
ing populations of organisms in their differential survival. 
But organisms can actively transform their environments 
for adaptive reasons and so construct new ecological 
niches that will be the frame of selective pressures for 
the next generations” (Pievani 2016b, p. 35). In addition, 
he proposes that these feedbacks and recursive processes 
occur at different levels and that such “multilevel niche 
construction” demonstrates the recursive relationships 
between the ecological and genealogical hierarchies 
(Pievani 2016b). We contend that this is one of the areas 
in which further collaborative work between advocates of 
NCT/EES and HTE might put our suggestion of epistemic 
bridges to the test.
Conceptual Rifts and Tensions Between 
the HTE and the EES: Multilevel Selection, 
Macroevolution, Ecological Inheritance, 
and Externalism
The Ambiguous Relationship of the EES to Multilevel 
Selection and Macroevolution (an Apparent Rift 
that Might be a Bridge?)
The Hierarchy Theory of Evolution consents and encourages 
the incorporation of the now well-studied phenomenon of 
multilevel selection (Pievani and Serrelli 2013; Pievani and 
Parravicini 2016; see Okasha 2006 for an overview). In the 
same sense, the study of macroevolutionary processes and 
patterns is a major concern for HTE research (Lieberman 
et al. 2007; Eldredge 2008), and one of the main reasons 
it was proposed in the first place: to attempt a successful 
explanation of macroevolutionary patterns, something the 
MS failed to do (Eldredge 1985; see also Lieberman 2016). 
Some advocates of the EES endorse multilevel selection in 
their individual publications (e.g. Pigliucci 2009; Sloan-
Wilson 2010; Müller 2014), but that notion is apparently 
undervalued and scarcely mentioned in the most recent 
multi-authored portrayal of the structure of the EES (see 
Laland et al. 2015). Likewise, the current structure of the 
EES (Laland et al. 2015) lacks an explicit theory of mac-
roevolution. Besides claiming that macroevolution is not 
‘microevolution writ large’, and that evolutionary processes 
emphasized by this theoretical framework (such as develop-
mental bias and ecological inheritance) help explain mac-
roevolutionary patterns and contribute to evolvability, not 
much is said in that regard (see Laland et al. 2015). Two 
reasons could be alluded to explain these absences: on the 
one hand, future formal developments are simply needed; on 
the other, perhaps, the conceptual treatment of the extended 
ontology of evolutionary processes of the EES underesti-
mates the importance of multilevel selection and/or of hav-
ing a differentiated theoretical framework to robustly explain 
macroevolution. If the first option is preferred, an epistemic 
bridge between the EES and the HTE is in sight; however, if 
one complies with the second insight, this could represent a 
conceptual rift that might complicate the unification. As the 
EES allows for top-down causation, an important component 
in the literature of the levels of selection (see Okasha 2011), 
and expanded models of causation (see Sect. 2.2), the inte-
gration of multilevel selection into the working framework 
of the EES might not be onerous (although some authors 
could claim that this has already been done). In contrast, the 
articulation and integration of explanations of specific mac-
roevolutionary patterns might prove to be more challeng-
ing for the EES. Four of such patterns (which are important 
for paleontologists defending the HTE stance; e.g. Lieber-
man et al. 2007) have not been addressed in the purported 
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structure of the EES (Laland et al. 2015): these are geo-
graphic isolation, stasis, cross-genealogical turnover events, 
and mass-extinctions.
Paleontologist William Miller (2016, p. 245) recently 
summarized some of the critiques that emerged in the last 
decades from his camp toward the microevolutionary pur-
view of the MS: “Empirical evidence from studies of (…) 
properties of species-lineages, speciation patterns (…), 
trends in clade history and differences in evolutionary rates, 
the possibility of species selection, and regional and global 
mass extinctions (…) indicates clearly that there is more 
to evolution than patterns resulting from scaled-up, gradual 
changes within demes”. We think the same critique could 
apply to the evolutionary causes and processes studied by the 
EES: even though they might be of crucial importance, there 
is indeed still much more to evolution. The full gamut of 
(macro)evolutionary processes and patterns is not currently 
being addressed by that conceptual framework; in particular, 
many questions remain open regarding the tempo and mode 
of evolution (see Allmon 2016). In this context, we suggest 
that the EES should not turn its back to the evolutionary 
insights gained from paleontology and paleobiology. With-
out excluding other conceptual possibilities, a hierarchical 
view of nature (some may argue) could be the bridge to 
a theory of macroevolution that encompasses the extended 
ontology of evolutionary processes postulated by the EES.
HTE and the Challenge to Accommodate Ecological 
Inheritance and Other Extra‑Genetic Channels 
of Heredity
NCT acknowledges two legacies that organisms inherit from 
their ancestors: genes and a modified environment with its 
associated selection pressures shaped by preceding rounds of 
niche construction (i.e. ecological inheritance; EI) (Odling-
Smee et al. 2003). The evolutionary legacy described by 
the concept of EI strongly affects evolutionary dynamics 
(Odling-Smee et al. 2013; Laland et al. 2016), and contrib-
utes to parent-offspring similarity through the (re)construc-
tion of developmental environments, something critical for 
the development of many multicellular organisms and the 
recurrence of traits across generations (Badyaev and Uller 
2009). In recent times, EI has become central to broaden 
the deeply entrenched and restricted conception of heredity 
held by the MS and the SET, as part of an inclusive view 
of inheritance that goes beyond transmission genetics and 
entails important evolutionary consequences (Danchin et al. 
2011; Laland et al. 2016). The notion of ‘inclusive inherit-
ance’ is paramount in extended frameworks of evolutionary 
theory (see Danchin et al. 2011), chiefly in the EES (see 
Laland et al. 2015).
It has been convincingly argued that EI differs in sev-
eral features from genetic inheritance (Odling-Smee 2009; 
Odling-Smee and Laland 2011). First, EI is transmitted by 
organisms through the modification of the environment 
and not by “reproduction”, and is not reliant on “ecological 
replication” or on the action of any sort of discrete repli-
cators, as it depends entirely on sustained rounds of niche 
construction. In contrast to the biparental transmission of 
genes in sexual populations that happens only once for every 
reproductive event, EI “(…) is continuously transmitted by 
multiple organisms to multiple other organisms, within and 
between generations, throughout the lifetimes of organ-
isms” (Odling-Smee and Laland 2011, p. 223). Additionally, 
genetic relatedness is not a precondition for EI, as it can be 
transmitted by other organisms (related through ecological 
interactions) in shared ecosystems.
As we will see, the unique characteristics of this legacy 
complicate the accommodation and interpretation of this 
notion under the HTE; in fact, we think that ecological inher-
itance subtends a profound conceptual rift between the EES 
and the HTE. The genealogical hierarchy, concerned with 
the conservation and transmission of information through 
reproduction or replication, involves genetically-based sys-
tems: the micro-evolutionary level of genes is nested within 
the upper level of organisms, which are components of local 
demes and so on, all the way up to monophyletic taxa of 
higher taxonomic rank (Eldredge 1985, 2008; Parravicini 
and Pievani 2016). The ecological hierarchy, on the other 
hand, is all about ‘economic interactions’, i.e. those that 
grant physical survival and involve matter-energy transfer 
(Eldredge 1986; see also Miller 2008; Cooper et al. 2016). 
Organisms are nested within local conspecific populations 
(namely, avatars), which are parts of local ecosystems that 
belong to regional ecosystems, up to the whole biosphere 
(Eldredge 2008; Pievani 2016a; Parravicini and Pievani 
2016). If ecological inheritance does not implicate repro-
duction nor replication, and instead requires different pro-
cesses from those involved in the transmission of genetic 
information, where exactly does it fit in the two interrelated, 
yet separate, hierarchies of the HTE? Is it confounded some-
where in the genealogical hierarchy, or is it more closely 
aligned to the intricacies of the ecological hierarchy? Fur-
thermore, are the two hierarchies at all times and at all scales 
“non-coincident” (as claimed in Pievani and Serrelli 2013, 
p. 396)? This conceptual rift must be surmounted if the HTE 
and the EES are going to engage in a conversation regarding 
ecological inheritance.
Niles Eldredge, with a long-standing interest in the par-
allels between biological and cultural evolution of artifacts 
that led him to recognize the idiosyncrasies of the latter (see 
Eldredge 2000; Tëmkin and Eldredge 2007), has confronted 
similar issues in his attempts to use the HTE framework to 
tackle questions related to material cultural evolution (espe-
cially of complex systems such as human manufacturing of 
products, e.g. musical instruments, designed and built for the 
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marketplace). His answer (Eldredge 2009) to the peculiari-
ties of material cultural evolution relies on expanding the 
roster of hierarchies by inserting a third hierarchy between 
the two canonical hierarchies of “pure” information and 
economics.3 This new hierarchy (that, in itself, is actually a 
dual structure of information and economics) refers to the 
actual ‘makers’ of material culture. So, the proposal of an 
additional hierarchy that specifically accommodates the 
intricacies of ecological inheritance and niche-constructing 
activities of organisms might function as a way out of the EI 
conundrum. Whether this turns out to be an ad hoc strategy 
only or a well-thought and sophisticated model, will be up 
to defenders of the HTE.
Similar problems for the HTE (but not as dramatic as 
the case of EI) emerge when we bring into the picture dif-
ferent channels of extra-genetic inheritance endorsed in the 
EES (see Laland et al. 2015): what to make of epigenetic 
and symbolic inheritance? (see also Jablonka and Lamb 
2014). Where do they fit in the so-called “ontologically real” 
hierarchies of nature espoused by the HTE? For instance, 
epigenetic inheritance in the broad sense encompasses any 
inherited developmental variations that do not stem from 
differences in DNA sequence (e.g. cellular inheritance of 
self-sustaining feedback loops; structural inheritance of pre-
existing membranes or cellular structures; chromatin mark-
ings such as covalent modifications in histones or differen-
tial methylation of nucleotides; RNA-mediated inheritance) 
or persistent inducing signals in the present environment 
(Jablonka and Lamb 2008). This view of epigenetic inherit-
ance countenances soma-to-soma information transfers that 
bypass the germline (e.g. routes of transmission involved in 
the acquisition of symbionts and parasites; transmissions of 
developmental products from parents to offspring). Follow-
ing Griesemer’s notion of ‘reproducer’ (see Griesemer 2000, 
2002), Jablonka and Lamb (2007, 2014) have argued that 
some epigenetic inheritance systems are reproducers without 
being ‘replicators’ (like genes supposedly are). A reproducer 
is a unit of multiplication, hereditary variation and develop-
mental capacities, hence there is not exclusively an informa-
tional link but also material overlap between generations of 
reproducers (Szathmáry 2006). This is one example of the 
peculiar characteristics of epigenetic inheritance systems, 
among others, that hinders the idea of a genealogical hier-
archy, as defended by the HTE, based on inter-generational 
transmission of information ensconced within genomes (but 
see Caianiello 2016).
Contrasting Stances on the ‘Externalism‑Internalism 
Debate’
The opposition between “internalist” and “externalist” view-
points has been addressed in many historiographies of biol-
ogy, psychology, philosophy and the social sciences (God-
frey-Smith 1996). Two illustrative examples of large-scale 
externalist programs are empiricism in epistemology (i.e. 
the philosophical stance that proclaims that the contents of 
thought are determined, directed or strongly constrained by 
the properties of experience) and adaptationism in biology. 
Seeing with adaptationist glasses is to understand biological 
structures, and evolution in general, as adaptive responses 
to environmental conditions; as recalled by Godfrey-Smith 
(1996, p. 32), “(t)he primary mechanism for this adaptive 
response recognized today is natural selection on genetic 
variants; genes are a channel through which the environ-
ment speaks”. In contrast, biologists that uphold internal-
ism usually assert that it is impossible to explain organic 
form, and the course of evolution for that matter, by simply 
attending to the structure or dynamics of the environments 
inhabited by organisms, where the latter thrive and repro-
duce. Furthermore, an internalist would say that “organic 
structure is strongly constrained, and in some cases deter-
mined, by internal factors associated with the integrated 
nature of living systems” (Godfrey-Smith 1996, p. 37). 
Independently, the historian and philosopher of biology 
Ron Amundson (2001) has suggested that the dichotomy 
characterized here as ‘externalism-internalism’ is just a 
revamped version of one of the oldest issues in compara-
tive biology: the contraposition between “functionalist” and 
“structuralist” approaches with a common goal, which is 
explaining “organic form” (see also Sansom 2009). Accord-
ing to philosopher of science Denis Walsh (2015, p. 183), 
such dialectic opposition of explanatory views “has left an 
indelible mark on the history of evolutionary biology”, and 
is pretty much alive today: “Many of the debates in cur-
rent evolutionary biology and its philosophy take the form 
of a turf war, an attempt to carve out a larger territory for 
either the “internalist” explanations that advert to the inner 
processes of inheritance and development, or the “external-
ist” explanations that advert to the selecting influence of the 
environment” (ibidem). To finish this subsection, we point 
out an additional conceptual rift between the EES and the 
HTE: namely, the different standpoints held by these frame-
works with respect to the ‘externalism-internalism’ debate.
Eldredge’s (2003) Sloshing Bucket model, which is 
central to the HTE, is also relevant to the discussion 
between externalist and internalist viewpoints in the 
philosophy of contemporary evolutionary biology. Built 
by compiling evidence from geology, paleoecology and 
paleontology, his model of stability and change recog-
nizes and exalts environmental change as the overarching 
3 We should clarify that, for Eldredge, these hierarchies are only 
analogous to the biological hierarchies, with no ontological equiva-
lency.
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control of the evolutionary process. According to this 
model, in the history of life we see clear connections 
between the severity and scope of environmental pertur-
bations and ecological disturbances, and the magnitudes 
of resultant evolutionary changes and effects (Lieber-
man et al. 2007; Pievani and Serrelli 2013). An example 
of those connections is the abiotic control of the evo-
lutionary dynamics of stasis (see Eldredge et al. 2005). 
Eldredge (2008) posits that environmental jolts have 
matching evolutionary reactions (i.e. the bigger they get, 
the larger is the response), as water sloshing in a bucket. 
It seems that the proponents of the HTE align with an 
externalist view of evolution, but one fairly distinct from 
adaptationism. Here is an evocative excerpt of the exter-
nalist standpoint defended by the proponents of the HTE: 
“(…) the ultimate causal controls in evolution emanate, 
not from the genome, nor from environmental compo-
nents of natural selection, but rather from the internal 
dynamics of ecosystems when critical points are reached 
through external physical environmental factors” (Lieber-
man et al. 2007, pp. 28–29). On the contrary, the EES is 
especially opposed to the kind of externalism instanti-
ated by stringent adaptationism. In Pigliucci and Müller 
(2010b, p. 14) we read that “(t)he overcoming of gradual-
ism, externalism, and gene centrism are general hallmarks 
of the Extended Synthesis” (emphasis added). Moreover, 
we interpret the global standpoint of the EES, albeit not 
explicitly stated in Laland et al. (2015), as a denunciation 
of the artificialness of the distinction between “internal” 
and “external” causal factors in development and evo-
lution, and as a denial of the usefulness of maintaining 
the dichotomy for explaining organismal evolution. The 
proposal of reciprocal causation, in turn crucial for the 
EES, invites researchers to rethink the very same ideas of 
‘internalism’ and ‘externalism’.
If one posture fosters the dichotomy (strongly sup-
porting one side) and the other encourages its abandon-
ment, how to bridge the gap between these two radical 
explanatory views? After centuries of heated debates, is 
the EES on a right track by dint of dissolving the ‘false 
dichotomy’? Can the primacy of environmental dynam-
ics recede in future versions of the HTE, without dis-
torting the core message of that framework? Notwith-
standing the tensions implicit in this issue, we think that 
interesting empirical questions can be asked for the EES 
regarding important processes highlighted by the HTE 
(see Lieberman et al. 2007). For example, what happens 
with evolutionary processes such as niche construction, 
phenotypic plasticity, or genetic accommodation during 
the reorganization of a regional ecosystem or in the midst 
of a turnover pulse?
Final Remarks
This paper was written in the interest of encouraging scien-
tific, philosophical and historiographical discussions about 
epistemological pluralism and/or theoretical unification in 
contemporary evolutionary biology, strictly focusing on 
commonalities and differences between the HTE and the 
EES. In this regard, some final points should be kept in 
mind for future discussions: What if the denunciation of 
the artificialness of the internalism–externalism dichotomy 
is the outcome of the organism-centered view of evolution 
defended by the proponents of the EES? As a matter of fact, 
Pievani points in this direction (2016b, p. 358): “While the 
views of the opposing side (the so-called standard theory) 
are polemically branded as “gene-centered” and too narrow 
(Laland et al. 2014), it is interesting to note that so far, the 
extended synthesis is strongly focused on organism as the 
fulcrum of evolutionary change”. Pievani (2016b) also sees 
the ‘organism-centrism’ of the EES as a shortcoming and 
still as a restricted outlook, because evolution is a process 
occurring at different levels; in contrast, he claims that the 
“(…) hierarchy theory is a different extended synthesis able 
to cover all the levels that make the evolutionary game so 
complex, from genes to organisms to species and the largest 
ecological scenarios” (p. 360; emphasis added). Although 
we agree with this philosopher of biology that the organism-
centered view of the EES (explicitly embraced by its propo-
nents, see Table 1 of Laland et al. 2015) might have some 
drawbacks, we think that the reconstitution of the organism 
as an explanatory category for evolutionary biology, after it 
was concealed to the background by the MS and the SET, 
could prove to be a momentous triumph (see Bateson 2005; 
Pepper and Herron 2008; Nicholson 2014; Sultan 2015; 
Walsh 2015). Further reflections are needed to ponder and 
assess the consequences of a possible revival of organicism 
in biology (Gilbert and Sarkar 2000; Etxeberria and Umerez 
2006; Denton et al. 2013; Nicholson 2014).
Practicing scientists, especially those interested in the 
long-dead biota, have recognized that in the study of organ-
ismal evolution there is an “epistemological gap” between 
the timescales and approaches used by neontologists when 
compared to paleontologists (Kemp 1999; Van Bocxlaer and 
Hunt 2013). In the same line of thought, some philosophers 
of science have argued that there is a genuine difficulty in 
combining the distinctive data of these two fields of scien-
tific inquiry (Grantham 2004). Paleontologists face serious 
underdetermination problems when they try to excavate the 
underlying causal processes of the large-scale trends found 
in the fossil record (Turner 2009). On the other hand, pale-
ontologists have disputed that “to extrapolate from ecologi-
cal observations to events seen in the fossil record that took 
tens and hundreds of thousands of years to come to fruition 
requires a huge act of faith on the part of neontologists” 
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(Kemp 1989, p. 93). In fact, these two groups are tradition-
ally, and notoriously, unfamiliar with each other’s data, 
methodologies, epistemic assumptions, etcetera. That most 
of the proponents from the academic camps of the EES and 
the HTE are engaged, respectively, in the scientific and 
philosophical study of neontological phenomena (e.g. devel-
opment; inheritance; niche construction) with an emphasis 
on processes, and paleontological issues (e.g. stasis; evo-
lutionary trends; extinction; higher taxa) with an emphasis 
on patterns and entities, remains a major epistemological 
stumbling block to keep in mind for future discussions.4 Pos-
sible avenues of cooperation may be pursed in the spirit of 
Elizabeth Vrba’s (1993) assessment of how particular (eco-
logical) processes may relate to patterns in the fossil record, 
where she famously reviewed a number of hypotheses that 
predict patterns of speciation and extinction (i.e. turn-over 
pulses, Van Valen’s Red Queen, Red Queen steady state and 
stationary models), in an endeavor to tell apart the initiating 
causes of macroevolution that are physical from those that 
are biotic (this is a good example in which processes do not 
have to be treated completely disentangled from patterns; 
see also Vrba 1985, 2005).
Prospectively, additional epistemic bridges and concep-
tual rifts between the HTE and the EES might be suggested. 
Nevertheless, we also admit that it remains a challenge, to 
the proponents of both frameworks or for others scholars, 
to determine if the ones presented here are meaningful. In 
conclusion, one last question could be formulated: Are these 
epistemic bridges and opportunities for integration sufficient 
to overcome the conceptual rifts and explanatory tensions 
between the EES and the HTE?
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